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Managing Extractive Resource Wealth for Sustainability: 
Alaska in the Time of Falling Oil Production 
 
 
Cash economies in many parts of the Arctic North have long been dominated by 
resource extraction industries such as petroleum and metal mining.  These 
developments are often short lived, generating cycles of economic booms followed by 
busts.  And the wealth created by these activities tends to flow South, as profits to large 
firms and wages to temporary residents.  But in Alaska the Permanent Fund (and a 
number of smaller financial accounts), has captured a significant share of the wealth 
generated by the production of petroleum over the last 30 years.  Alaska residents now 
have the opportunity to use this wealth (currently estimated at $45 billion in financial 
assets and $81 billion in the state share of oil still in the ground) to build a strong 
economy, not only for the current generation but for future generations of Alaskans as 
well.  This will be a unique challenge, balancing the needs of current and future 
generations, the preferences of urban and rural residents, permanent and temporary 
citizens, and others.  This paper will examine the challenges facing Alaska as it begins 
the task of wealth management in an era of declining petroleum production.  This 
should provide lessons for other regions impacted by cycles of resource extractive 
industries. 
 This study is one in a series of reports in the ISER program 
 
Investing for Alaska’s Future 
 
Underwritten by a generous grant from 
 
Northrim Bank 
 
 
 
With support from 
University of Alaska Foundation 
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Managing Extractive Resource Wealth for Sustainability: 
Alaska in the Time of Falling Oil Production 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Alaskans have always been dependent on the rich natural resources of the state for 
their livelihood and prosperity--from the fur seals and salmon before European contact 
to the timber, minerals, and petroleum of more recent times.  Production has often been 
at a small cost compared to value.  Thus for example, the bountiful salmon provided the 
basis for the rich Native American culture in the Alaskan panhandle that gave rise to a 
beautiful artistic heritage.  With the arrival of the Europeans, commercial markets for 
these resources developed, and the with ., and this Exploitation hasone recent 
projection of employment in currently producing areas shows only a modest decline in 
employment over the next two decades.   
 
The most well known example of this exploitation was the dominance of the salmon 
harvest by seattle.  Also the mine at mccarthy. 
 
With statehood and public ownership of resources that changed.  Now the state has 
both the power to tax and the ownership.  It cannot control labor supply, and this is a 
politically touchy subject, but the state has the ability now to capture a larger share of 
the value of the resources produced fpr the benefit of Alaskans.  In fact it is in the 
constitution. 
 
It has not done this in a consistent way.  Fish vs petroleum. 
 
And a lot of concern that the stat is not getting its “fair shaire” (the oil companies are all 
non resident.) 
 
But the state has collected $150 billion in the last 50 years from oil. 
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The resources of the state are unevenly distributed across the state.  Three good 
examples of local governments capturing a share of the value of production.  North 
Slope Borough using taxation of property.  Taxes go for jobs and infrastructure.  
Northwest Arctic Borough mining development is on native American land of Nana 
Regional Corporation.  Operated by private company paying royalties to Nana and 
hiring shareholders.  CDQs in SW Alaska get a share of the allocation of bottomfish.  
What do they do with it. 
 
So there are many ways to appropriate a share of the value of the resource—both the 
jobs and the economic rents.  The purpose of this paper is not to discuss methods of 
appropriation, although they are clearly important,(fair share, jobs vs income, etc.) but 
rather to look at management of the economic rents collected. 
 
There are other economic development strategies, but what are they? 
 
THE BASIC RULE FOR WEALTH MANAGEMENT 
 
In the typical case, the extraction value of a communally owned non-renewable natural 
resource deposit will follow the pattern over time shown in Figure 1.  In the early years 
the value of production will be high because the highest value reserves will be produced 
first.  Over time production will move to lower value deposits with higher costs, and 
eventually production will stop when the cost of production becomes prohibitive. 
 
Figure 1 
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This production profile creates two potential problems if the resource value is large 
relative to the size of the regional economy.  First, it can create a temporary economic 
boom from local spending to purchase labor and other inputs to extract the resource.  
Second, it can create a challenge for the region to distribute any economic benefits 
associated with extraction of the resource equitably both across the population and over 
time. 
 
Those local benefits consist of jobs and business opportunities for residents and the 
profits from the operation shared with the region as taxes, royalties, or other payments.  
If the regional economy were very small, it might provide neither labor nor business 
support for the extraction operation in which case it would occur within an “enclave” 
which would be physically within the region, but not connected to the region 
economically.  In that case the benefits to the region would consist entirely of 
consumption goods purchased from outside the community paid for with the locally 
retained profits. 
 
The question then becomes how to manage those profits generated from this non-
renewable collectively owned resource.  One obvious answer is to spend them as they 
accrue which would result in a time pattern of spending similar to figure 1.  Spending 
would then be high in the early years and gradually taper off as production declined.  
This spending could result in a temporary economic boom in employment and business 
activity within the community that was not sustainable.  The timing of other benefits 
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could also follow the pattern of spending, creating a temporary increase followed by a 
drop.   
 
However the community might view the windfall from the profits as an opportunity to 
increase the sustainable level of economic activity and prosperity within the community 
and so try to manage them for that purpose by saving some of the profits for future use. 
Two simple savings rules have been suggested to accomplish this—Bird-in-the-Hand 
and Permanent Income (Sustainable Spending). 
 
The Bird-in-the-Hand rule says to put all current revenues from resource production into 
a savings account and spend only the earnings generated by that account each year.1  
With this rule spending would begin low and gradually increase over time.  When 
resource production ended all the revenues that it had generated would be in a financial 
savings account and from that point forward a constant and sustainable flow of annual 
earnings would be available for the benefit of the community. 
 
This rule is attractive because of its simplicity, ease of implementation, and intuitive 
appeal.  Its shortcomings are that it requires incredible discipline to forego using any 
current revenues as they are collected, and it gives more weight to future needs relative 
to immediate ones.  It would be better to try to distribute the benefits equitably between 
current and future needs. 
 
The Permanent Income rule explicitly tries to allocate the benefits from exploitation of 
the resource over time between the current and future populations.  It starts with an 
estimate of the total value of the non-renewable asset to the community.  Before 
production begins this is the present value of the revenues the community will collect as 
the resource is produced.2  As production occurs and revenues are collected, the value 
of revenues in the ground declines, but this would be offset if the amount added to 
                                                 
1
 This is basically the approach taken by Norway and the approach suggested for Alaska by Roger Cremo which 
became known as the “Cremo Plan”  
2
 One could also think of it as the market value of the future stream of revenues if they were sold.  
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savings increased each year by the same amount.  The community would then have a 
portfolio of assets consisting of savings from a share of past revenues and the value of 
revenues yet to be collected from resources yet to be produced.  Over time savings 
would increase and the value of resources in the ground would fall, and when all the 
resources had been produced the value of the portfolio would be entirely in savings and 
be equal to the initial value of the resource in the ground. 
 
The value of the portfolio would be constant over time and spending each year would 
equal a fixed rate of return on that portfolio.  This stream of spending would be constant 
and sustainable both during the period of resource production and beyond after 
production had ended.  Annual spending would be independent of the composition of 
the portfolio. 
 
The composition of the portfolio using this Permanent Income rule is shown in Figure 2 
which shows that initially the wealth is held entirely as the physical asset (net present 
value of future revenues).  As production proceeds and the revenues are collected, 
some of them are deposited into a growing savings account.  By the time the resource 
has been exhausted the value of the financial account has grown to exactly replace the 
initial value of the resource which has fallen to zero.  The value of the portfolio remains 
constant at every point in time.  (See appendix for numerical example.) 
 
Figure 2 
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The constant annual level of spending in the early years comes from a share of current 
revenue not saved, later from a combination of revenues and some savings account 
earnings, and finally entirely from earnings of the savings account.  However in the first 
couple of years in this example before there is any savings in the portfolio, current 
revenues are less than the annual earnings of the portfolio.  As a result in the first 
couple of years current revenues are augmented by borrowing in order to have enough 
cash to fund spending (financial debt in Figure 2).  As current revenues rise above the 
constant spending level, this initial borrowing is repaid and savings begins. 
 
Annual spending using the Permanent Income rule for wealth management is higher in 
the early years than using the Bird in the Hand rule, but eventually it is less.  If the 
objective is to spread the benefits of the wealth equitably over time, the Permanent 
Income rule does a better job.  It results in the maximum level of annual spending that is 
sustainable over time. 
 
Figure 3 Annual Spending 
 
 
The ultimately higher sustainable spending level with the Bird in the Hand rule results 
because the portfolio of assets is not constant over time but increases in value as 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 
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The Permanent Income rule is more difficult to understand and to implement than the 
Bird in the Hand rule.  With the Bird in the Hand rule the savings rate is constant—
100%--and spending varies with the size of the savings account.  With the Permanent 
Income rule spending is constant and the savings rate varies from year to year based 
on the size of current revenue relative to that constant spending amount.  There is no 
simple answer to the question of how much or what percentage should be saved out of 
current revenues for future needs.3 As we have seen in the initial years saving is likely 
to be actually negative. 
 
The Permanent Income rule is thus confusing if the question of wealth management is 
posed as is often the case as “Are we saving enough?”  A savings rate out of current 
revenues that fluctuates from year to year can be confusing to people asking that 
question.  And the same is true if the cumulative share of revenues saved is used as an 
indicator of whether savings is adequate.  Figure 5 shows that the cumulative share of 
revenue saved following the Permanent Income rule in this particular case starts at 
zero, grows rapidly to 45% and ultimately falls off to 20%..This is in marked contrast to 
100% as the cumulative share saved using the Bird in the Hand rule. 
                                                 
3
 One of the important questions asked when the Alaska Permanent Fund was proposed was what share of 
petroleum royalties should be deposited into the fund.  The legislature decided on 25%.  This was about 10% of total 
petroleum revenues consisting not only of royalties but also severance, income, and property taxes.  Revenues not 
deposited into the fund have not necessarily been spent, at least not in the year received, but the annual volatility of 
those revenues does mean that with a constant savings rule there is more volatility in annual spending. 
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Figure 5 Cumulative Share of Revenue Saved 
 
 
Is there a compromise between these two rules that produces an ultimate portfolio of 
savings equal to the Permanent Income rule and is as easy to understand and 
administer as the Bird in the Hand rule?  A modified Bird in the Hand rule where 50% of 
current revenues were saved and 50% spent would be such a compromise………… 
 
But apart from its variable savings rate, the real challenge with use of the Permanent 
Income rule is the need to estimate the current value of future revenues from the non 
renewable resource.  This requires knowledge of not only the future price profile of the 
resource but also the cost of production over time and the size of the economically 
recoverable deposit.  All of these in turn are dependent upon technological changes 
over the life of production.  As the wealth is converted from future revenues into 
financial savings the uncertainty in estimating the value of the portfolio declines but it 
does not disappear. 
 
This uncertainty can be dealt with in two ways.  First, the value of the portfolio can be 
periodically re-evaluated and revised.  Increases would increase the size of the 
sustainable annual spending amount and vice versa.  Second, the size of the 
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sustainable annual spending amount can be risk adjusted to reflect the uncertainty in 
the ultimate value of the portfolio.  However the direction of any adjustment is not 
obvious.  A downward adjustment is consistent with the idea that the ultimate pain from 
overestimation is greater than the pain from an equal sized underestimate.  On the 
other hand an upward adjustment is consistent with the idea that forecasts tend to by 
myopic, particularly with regard to technological change that can enhance the value of 
resource deposits. 
 
The Permanent Income rule can be readily modified to account for anticipated changes 
in future conditions.  If population is expected to grow, the consumption draw rate can 
be modified so that it is constant per person.4   If future needs are expected to be 
greater than current needs then the current consumption draw rate can be reduced 
relative to the future.5 
 
SOME COMPLICATING FACTORS 
 
The description of the Permanent Income rule has assumed that the savings account 
consists of investments made outside the community and that the benefits to the 
community come entirely from the consumption goods purchased from outside the 
region using the earnings from the wealth portfolio.  With these assumptions the 
application of the Permanent Income rule to the management of natural resource wealth 
makes the community richer, because its annual sustainable rate of consumption has 
increased, but the economy, measured by jobs, is no bigger than it was before 
exploitation of the natural resource. 
 
INVESTMENT SPENDING 
                                                 
4
 For example, if the real return on the portfolio is 5% and the population growth rate is 1%, then an annual 
consumption draw of 4% would maintain the per capita value of the wealth portfolio by increasing its total value by 
1% annually. 
 
5
 Norway reduces the current annual draw from their fund to account for the aging of their population and the 
expected increase in public benefits that will entail. 
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Community residents benefit from investment spending as well as current consumption 
spending.  A successful investment produces a stream of benefits that extends for many 
years into the future.  So community benefits are maximized not by a sustainable level 
of spending, but rather by a sustainable level of benefits flowing from a combination of 
consumption and capital spending. 
 
Infrastructure investments can be incorporated into the Permanent Income rule by 
including them as a separate account in an expanded asset portfolio including the value 
of those investments as well as the savings account, and the revenues yet to be 
collected on future resource production.  Now the maximum sustainable flow is not of 
spending but rather of benefits.  Now we assume the community is able to allocate 
spending so that each dollar of spending on current consumption generates benefits of 
at least one dollar and that each dollar of spending on infrastructure generates benefits 
worth at least as much as putting that dollar into savings—the rate of return on 
investment. 
 
An infrastructure investment can be financed either by paying cash--drawing down the 
savings account--or by borrowing.  Either way the value of the savings account falls by 
the transfer of fund to the infrastructure account.  The annual consumption draw--based 
on the portfolio excluding the infrastructure investment account—falls by the same 
amount that the annual benefit associated with the infrastructure increases.  The total 
annual benefit is unchanged but its composition is different. 
 
Whatever the spending it should be on what returns the highest return per $1 spent.  It 
could be $1 or $2 or more, but not less than $1. 
 
If the purpose of the investment is to generate a financial return rather than 
consumption benefits, then it only maintains the net worth of the portfolio if its financial 
return is equal to the financial return on the savings account.6 
                                                 
6
 Determining that either operations or capital spending generates benefits equal to their cost is not easy when 
decisions are made collectively. 
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RESIDENT JOBS 
 
The provision of services or the construction of infrastructure may require the use of 
onsite labor.7  Furthermore residents might prefer to fill those jobs to collect the wages.  
If residents fill all the demand for onsite labor the community benefits not only from the 
services paid by the windfall, but also from the increase in income from the wages. 
 
This introduces a complication for spreading the benefits equitably over time, but only 
for spending on infrastructure because wages are paid during construction.  tions 
spending since wages follow the time pattern of benefits, but it does for infrastructure 
spending. is a problem if it creates labor demand from outside the community, but not 
for spending if the spending is debt financed and paid back over time at a rate 
consistent with the benefits generated.  The amount in the financial account is 
unchanged. 
 
Also a problem with resource extraction. 
 
For a community new jobs for residents would be a benefit if the jobs were taken by 
persons currently unemployed.8  The wage could be used to measure the benefit of 
such a job provided to an unemployed resident of the community. 
 
Then the benefits flowing to the community would be both the wealth from rents and 
taxes and the wages paid to residents.  How does this additional source of benefit 
impact the Permanent Income rule of management? 
 
                                                 
7
 Non-resident labor can indirectly generate local labor as well if local businesses provide services to those 
workers.. 
 
8
 A new job that diverts a resident away from a job he already can be counted if it puts some other unemployed 
resident to work. 
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If community benefit were redefined to include wages as well as the spending from 
rents and taxes, the Permanent Income rule would need to be modified so that the sum 
of the two was constant.  When employment and wages was high, spending from 
assets would be low, and vice versa.  Total annual benefits would be higher because of 
the addition of the wage income into the community.  The total annual benefit would be 
based on the net present value of the sum of wages, rents, and tax revenue. 
 
Figure 7 
 
 
Although total community benefits are sustainable under this expanded Permanent 
Income rule, if wages are not appropriately distributed among residents, the benefits 
cannot be equitably distributed among community residents either at any point in time or 
over time (without complicated sharing or trading which would make the benefits 
“fungible”).  The rent distribution can be somewhat compensating. 
 
If wages paid to residents who would otherwise be unemployed count as benefits to the 
community in addition to the benefits provided by the services provided by those jobs, 
then that spending generates more benefit per dollar spent.  In this case an expenditure 
with benefits worth less than $1 could make sense if the wage brought the total over $1.  
For an operating expenditure, the sum of the two categories would need to be $1.  For a 
ISER / Managing Extractive Resource Wealth 13 June 2011 
capital expenditure, the sum of the present value of the two categories would need to 
equal $1.  This does not mean that the level of spending would be higher, but rather that 
the benefit for spending would be greater than $1 because of the local capture of 
wages.  And it might mean that the composition of spending would be different.  
 
In an extreme case, spending could go entirely to wages for currently unemployed 
residents in some activity with no intrinsic value—like digging holes and filling them in.  
It is possible these wages would generate as much benefit to the community as 
spending on some public consumption good provided from outside the community.  But 
it should be possible to find something of positive value for these workers to do for their 
wages. 
 
With the introduction of wages as a category of benefits, it becomes more difficult to 
smooth the economic benefits in time and to distribute them equitably across residents 
in the community because only a few residents get wage income but everyone shares in 
the public consumption spending.  Wage recipients have high benefits when there are 
jobs, but other residents receive few benefits if public spending is low during that time to 
compensate.  Wage earners do have the ability to save some of their wage income in 
anticipation of the end of their employment, but recipients of public benefits do not have 
that option.  If some of the public benefits were instead distributed as cash to all 
residents, then those not benefiting from wages would have more flexibility over time in 
the distribution of their benefits, but that would not solve the problem of some residents 
getting more benefits than others because of wage employment. 
 
MIGRATION 
 
Over time residents may leave the community and new people come in to replace them.  
Outsiders may also be drawn into the community by the employment opportunities 
associated with the resource exploitation and the provision of services and the 
construction of infrastructure.  These additional workers who become new residents 
become benefit recipients alongside existing residents and increase the demand for any 
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scarce resources in the community.  Residents who leave the community lose their 
participation in the community benefits and reduce the demand for scarce resources. 9   
 
This raise two issues.  The first is the need to decide who should be entitled to the 
benefits flowing from the resource extraction.  The most obvious choices are either 
anyone who lives in the community, or only persons who were residents at some 
particular time and their decendents.  The second is the fact that a change in the size of 
the resident population impacts the distribution of benefits from resource exploitation.   
 
If anyone who is resident of the community is entitled to the benefits of resource 
exploitation, management of the wealth portfolio remains simple because the 
beneficiary population is easy to define.  However if only current residents are eligible to 
receive benefits, then they need to be delivered not as a steady stream over time, but 
rather as quickly as possible.  This will maximize the share going to current residents, 
but at the cost of receiving them all at once. 
 
The way around that problem would be to distribute the wealth as cash to current 
residents as a windfall.  In theory they would distribute the benefits of that windfall over 
time rather than spending them all at once.  This approach is clearly one of “people 
prosperity”.  The wealth is not tied to the community, but rather to the residents at one 
point in time.  With the distribution of wealth to the residents, they are free to live in the 
community or anywhere else.  The additional personal wealth could either be an 
incentive to stay in the community or to leave.  If residents stayed, some of that wealth 
could be used to support community needs. 
 
If the population increases there should be economies of scale in the provision of goods 
and services which should be a benefit to all.  But it will also increase the demand for 
scarce resources—like good fishing sites and real estate.  This will benefit the owners of 
                                                 
9
 A complicating factor of course is that when a job is created in a community it is not known whether it will be 
taken by an unemployed resident or a new immigrant. 
ISER / Managing Extractive Resource Wealth 15 June 2011 
those resources but disadvantage their consumers.  Each resident may weight these 
benefits and costs of growth differently.rrent residents.  
 
SCALE 
 
If the resource wealth is small relative to the size of the community it would be easy to 
manage because its effects would be small, but effects would be  alale—how does that 
play in  
 
Before and after—before nothing.  During a boom.  After dependent on financial 
earnings.  Is that bad?  What are you comparing the after environment to. 
 
OPERATIONALIZING THE RULE: THE STATE OF ALASKA 
 
The state received an enormous windfall when oil was discovered at Prudhoe Bay on 
the North Slope on state land.  Since 1977 production has been about 16 billion barrels 
with a market value of more than $500 billion (2010 $).  The state has collected xxx in 
revenues (2010 $).  These revenues have allowed the state to eliminate taxes on 
households, hold taxes on other natural resource production low, and expand public 
expenditures to double the per capita average of other states. 
 
Oil revenues xxx. Wages xxxx.  Capital spend xxx.  A big part of the economy. 
 
Constitution says the wealth should be managed for the benefit of all Alaskans.  So it is 
the owner state…. 
 
The state recognized the need to save a portion of the windfall as it was received for 
three reasons—keep the money out of the hands of the politicians, keep the economy 
from overheating, and to save for the post petroleum future. 
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Management of the windfall has involved putting about 23% into saving in three 
financial accounts—the Permnent Fund, the Constitutional Budget Reserve, and the 
Statutory Budget Reserve.  The objective of the Permanent Fund is to save a share of 
oil revenues in recognition of the fact the resource is not renewable.  The obljective of 
the Constitutional Budget Reserve is to provide a buffer against the year to year 
fluctuations in the oil revenues.  The objective of the Statutory Budget Resrve is xxxxxx. 
 
A spending cap was also put into place when the SBR was created, but it was too high.. 
The  
Each of these savings accounts was created at a time of current revenue surplus. 
 
The remainder of revenues, 77% or xxx has been spent on current operations, invested 
in capital goods like schools, roads, energy, or used to capitalize various funds 
providing loans (or operating revenues (poer cost equalization). 
 
Two policies have been established to control the growth in spending.  The first was the 
spending cap.  The second is through restriction of access to the CBR.  In addition there 
is an informal check on the use of the earnings of the Permanent Fune (aside from the 
Dividend itself.) 
 
Rocky road with ups and downs.  Booms, population growth, budget growth, saving 
when surplus available, draw when times were tight.   Advisory vote.  Saving in early 
years,  Taxes eliminated. 
 
Policies were never based on the Permanent Income rule, but we were lucky. 
 
Now a renewed sense of urgency because pipeline might shut down and ACES..  How 
to keep production (jobs) and how to maximize revenues.   
 
But no plan. 
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Who owns the windfall? 
 
The At the start of 2011 the state had $45 billion in these financial accounts.  Projected 
future production of oil on state land, from which the state receives revenues from 
royalties and 3 taxes, is 4.5 billion barrels.10  At an average market price of $100 per 
barrel, this is $450 billion.  The net present value of the projected state revenues from 
that production that would be collected from that production is $xx billion.11  Production 
of natural gas or unconventional oil (viscous oil, heavy oil, and shale oil) is not included 
in these projections.  The state does not make projections of future production on 
federal lands in or adjacent to the state (ANWR, NPRA, and OCS) or potential revenue 
from that production.  But since natural gas and unconventional oil production on state 
land is at least a decade away and more expensive than current production, the present 
value of revenues from that production is small.  The same is true for production on 
federal land. 
 
If we include an estimate of the present value of revenues from gas, unconventional oil, 
and production on federal lands of xx to the revenues from conventional production on 
state lands, the total present value of petroleum revenues still to be collected becomes 
$81 billion.  Together with the current financial assets derived from past production, the 
state has total petroleum wealth of $126 billion. 
 
When Alaskans say “it is our oil”, this is what they mean in terms of what it is worth. 
 
Where are we today wrt non financial assets.  Does it matter.No since they ae throwing 
off benefits..  Yes, because they show that we have actually saved more—AHFC, 
AIDEA, AEA, other capitalizations.  What about schools and harbors.  How do they fit 
into the picture. 
 
                                                 
10
 Alaska Department of Revenues, Revenue Sources, Fall 2009. 
 
11
 Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue Source Spring 2011. 
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The Permanent Income rule or Maximum Sustainable Yield or Preserving the Nest Egg, 
or Never Spend Principle, or Managing the Windfall, or Managing the Portfolio of 
Petroleum Wealth………. 
 
As it turns out we have saved almost exactly the amount that has maintained the per 
capita value of our nest egg based on actual petroleum revenues to date, and currently 
estimated future petroleum revenues.  In other words if we had known in 1977 what 
revenues would have been through this year and future revenue projections prove 
accurate the amount we have saved in financial accounts is right on target to keep us 
on the patch to sustaining our original windfall.  If we follow the Permanent Income rule 
until petroleum production ceases, the size of our financial accounts will be just as big 
as the original windfall. 
 
So at this point in time we are NOT overextended…….Yippee 
Spending of rents in early years does increase the wealth of the population –private 
development, so the assumption of constant wealth over time may be wrong.  
 
But this has happy result is due as much to good fortune as to good planning.  The 
estimated size of the windfall in 1977 was much less than xxxx both because production 
and price were projected to be lower than they have been since 1977.  Our actual level 
of spending was too high for the windfall calculated based on 1977 expectations.  It has 
only been because of the higher production and price that our windfall is now consistent 
with the size of our annual spending. 
 
But the current fiscal policy of the state does not reflect an explicit recognition of the 
finite nature of petroleum revenues or that the state has a one time windfall.  It is to try 
to save in good years and draw on savings in bad years.  This is not a rational policy 
because both conventional production on state lands and the revenues from that 
production are projected to fall with a FISCAL GAP between spending and revenues 
opening in future years.  This GAP could be filled using available surpluses for a few 
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years, but eventually those would be exhausted and a drastic combination of budget 
cuts and tax increases would be necessary to balance the budget.  The economy of the 
state, so dependent on state spending, would be decimated. 
 
The state could adopt the Permanent Income rule for spending of petroleum wealth.  
The state could then spend $5 billion in 2011 from petroleum wealth—current petroleum 
revenues and/or earnings from financial assets.  The spending rule could easily be 
adjusted to account for changes in the return on investment, population growth, 
estimated future petroleum revenues, myopia, etc.  In reality the rule would be a general 
guide for fiscal policy. 
 
The beauty of this rule is that all generations of Alaskans share equally in the benefits 
from spending from the petroleum wealth.  Total public spending can be greater than 
this amount, but other revenue sources, such as an income tax, would need to be used 
to generate that additional revenue.  The generation desiring the higher level of 
spending, and benefiting from it, would be the ones to pay for it.  Otherwise the current 
generation would be benefiting at the expense of a future generation. 
 
The Permanent Income rule is easy to describe and relatively easy to calculate, but it 
would be extremely difficult to implement in Alaska for a number of reasons. 
 
Here is how it might work. 
 
Not concerned with mix of spend between operations and capital (or distribution).  
Assume we can accurately measure the benefits from spending ( services, jobs, 
revenues net costs).  Since currently there is no state income tax, there is no political 
test of the value of public spending—either operations or capital.  However if the 
Permanent Income rule were adopted, spending above the amount indicated by the rule 
would have to come from a tax of some sort like the income tax.  If that were to happen, 
then there would be a political test of the benefits associated with any spending.  Or the 
PFD could provide that test as well. 
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A tax not only generates income directly.  It also reduces spending thru the discipline it 
instills. 
 
The benefit from an investment should be treated just as a benefit from spending out of 
annual earnings since it is really the same thing.  For example, give a subsidy each year 
for high energy price.  Or invest in some project that lowers energy costs.  We would 
just need to keep track of these investments and segregate them from the main 
account.  The earnings of the main account would fall and the annual draw, but the 
benefits from the investment would just offset that drop in the annual draw.   
 
 
What are the implications of spending faster than the sustainable rate?  Advantage of 
continued resource exploitation but not resource rents.  It doesn’t take anyone to 
generate the rents, but it does take a lot of workers to continue the resource 
exploitation—at very high wage rates 
 
So why is it likely? 
 
Reasons why it is difficult to implement the Permanent Income rule (The majority agree 
it would be a good thing, but cannot implement it): 
 
Now there is a big pile of money. 
 
 Lack of understanding of the structure and mechanism—this comes from 
population turnover and passage of time. 
 Uncertainty about size of asset, rate of return, population growth, future wealth, 
risk aversion 
 Spending currently thru the dividend—how does this constrain flexibility 
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 Political reality  Legislature and governor never vote for a tax increase.  Easier to 
increase the budget than to cut the budget.  Always current needs that are 
obvious compared to unknown future needs.  
 Individuals have positive discount rates.  This requires a zero discount rate.  
Maintaining discipline requires completely community decisionmaking.  Each 
person can simultaneously desire to pass as much on to next generation as he 
takes, but at the same time want to maximize his share of the present distribution 
of earnings. 
 Fragility of social contract—idea that we might exercise constraint, but some 
future generation will not.   
 Speculative migrants who come only to capture a share of the rents and then 
leave when they are gone. 
 How can current generation capture the rents –spend current rents and borrow against 
future rents so that future residents pay the bill.   
 
Reasons why we might not want to implement the Permanent Income rule 
 Aversion to public sector savings (savings is the state tax base) 
 Individuals do not feel commitment to future and feel the wealth belongs to them  
Personal discount rates high—no heirs, plans to leave, other 
Fear of the negative consequences of the rentier society (but we already are a 
rentier society)  Usually the fear is that a rentier society will not be able to create a civil 
society or democratization.  Also a bloated bureaucracy where citizenship becomea an 
asset.  There is concern for maintaining a bureaucracy for its own sake, but for Alaska 
the danger here is that of the trust fund baby syndrome. 
 Self selection of optimists who think savings is not necessary since there are 
many opportunities for growth (Winners curse) 
 We have heard this gloom and doom story in the past, but have always been 
lucky.  We will continue to be lucky—high prices and high production, gasline, 
etc. 
 Feeling that life was better in Alaska before petroleum and all the people it 
brought to the state 
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 Capital availability is constrained so not a free market situation 
 Money in the bank or other financial assets are not working for Alaska, they are 
helping some other economy  
 Future generations may have very different preferences 
Desire to continue growth of economy and jobs and spending is the way to 
accomplish this.  Coalition of business, l;arge established local property owners, get rich-quick 
migrants and other genuinely convince of the growth potential of the hinterland therefor tends to 
obby for the granspformation of natrurl rent into physical intrastrucutre  
 
 
Reasons why we should not adopt the Permanent Income Rule 
 
Spend more early on if the benefits from spending when poor are particularly high.  
Take from the financial account. 
 
Limited capital because projects are too big. 
 
Spend more early on because private wealth increasing during the exploitation stage. 
 
Those reasons are in the past. 
 
Combination of benefits  
 
Private vs public spending. 
 
Really no distinction between spend and invest. 
 
Consider three types of investments—one that generates benefits for residents, one 
that generates income for the state, and one that generates economic activity -- jobs 
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and business opportunities for residents.  Remember that the investment also requires 
maintenance costs in future years. 
 
An investment that generates a benefit is a direct substitute for operations spending that 
generates a benefit.  So if investment higher, then operations needs to be lower to 
maintain the Permanent Income rule. 
 
An investment that generates a financial return—like investing in an economically viable 
pipeline--should be evaluated against financial investments.  Without some other 
benefits, the gain from investing in a project within the state is just offset by the loss 
from withdrawing that capital from an alternate investment outside the state. 
 
Spending that generates economic activity is more difficult to assess, and most 
spending, either on operations or infrastructure, does generate economic activity.  .—
jobs and business sales--needs to be valued based on the value of those jobs and other 
economic activity.  Use wages, but are they going to residents or new comers.  What is 
the value of the other economic activity. 
 
The typical invesetment or spending may produce a combination of benefits, revenues, 
and jobs.  The problem is that if all revenues come from the wealth account, the growth 
in population and demand for public services associated with investments to  
 
Can this type of investment be beneficial.   
 
Clear winners would occur without public investment. 
 
Good example is spending on a road to access an oil field.  The current cost is too high, 
including the current tax bill.  So the purchase of the road reduces the cost and is like a 
reduction in taxes—although there are no taxes.  If the oil field is developed it generates 
jobs and revenues.  Is this an investment that can pay off.   
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Try to keep as close to the rule as possible. 
 
Discipline—how to get to get it. Ombudsman or independent group to screen 
infrastructure projects and public spending. 
 
How to simulate a crisis? 
 
Wait for a real crisis. 
 
 
 
Behind this is the uncertainty of development and jobs and business activity associated 
with federal petroleum reserves. 
 
NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH 
 
Rents and taxes.  Distribute benefits through govt spending on capital and public 
services.  What is happening to the population.  Local tax base sustainable as long as 
oil and gas production.  What about permanent Fund.  Not very big compared to 
expected wealth.  Initially spent a lot to bring quality of life up.  Now budget tighter.  
View fund as an alternative tax base. 
 
Did these two regions lose the most population , just because they were the richest?  
Did they change the most due to the windfalls. 
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AND NANA CORPORATION 
Distribute benefits throughJobs and payroll 
Half resident workers live outside region. 
What comes after the mine……..Investing outside the rgion for resident workers. 
Here the rents and wages are closely tied together so sustainability more difficult. 
 
 
What knid of spending is least likely to stimulate inmigration.—does this mean the pi 
rule should be modified to shift it towards the bith rule.  Or does it depend on what the 
earings are spent on. 
 
Will spending stimulate out migration (does not seem to be the case for Alaska, but it is 
for places where employment opportunities are limited.) 
 
Is this wehre people ves place prosperity comes in.  Start with people prosperity amd 
temper it with some place prosperity.??? 
 
d for consumption purchased outside the economy, there could be no adverse effects.  
If it is spent on locally produced goods and services in a situation where there  
is no excess supply of labor, then there would be an increase in  
 
GENERAL GUIDELINES 
 
Put some into place prosperity and some into people prosperity. 
 
 
How small and how isolated what comes after the mine—half the workers live 
elsewhere—opportunitey to migrate  
Resource ownership 
Use of proceeds and flexability 
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APPENDIX 
 
Bird-in-the-Hand
Yr Revenue
Financial 
Asset
Annual 
Draw
0
1 10$         10$         0.50$      
2 20$         30$         1.50$      
3 30$         60$         3.00$      
4 40$         100$       5.00$      
5 80$         180$       9.00$      
6 120$       300$       15.00$   
7 140$       440$       22.00$   
8 140$       580$       29.00$   
9 120$       700$       35.00$   
10 90$         790$       39.50$   
11 80$         870$       43.50$   
12 70$         940$       47.00$   
13 65$         1,005$    50.25$   
14 60$         1,065$    53.25$   
15 55$         1,120$    56.00$   
16 50$         1,170$    58.50$   
17 45$         1,215$    60.75$   
18 40$         1,255$    62.75$   
19 35$         1,290$    64.50$   
20 30$         1,320$    66.00$   
21 25$         1,345$    67.25$   
22 20$         1,365$    68.25$   
23 15$         1,380$    69.00$   
24 10$         1,390$    69.50$   
25 5$           1,395$    69.75$   
26 -$       1,395$    69.75$    
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Permanent Income / Sustained Yield
Yr Revenue
NPV 
Physical 
Asset
Annual 
Draw
Saved 
Revenue 
(A-C)
Financial 
Fund 
Balance
Sum of 
Assets 
(B+E)
Saving 
Ratio 
(D/A)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
0 $852.1 $852.1
1 10$         $884.8 $42.61 ($32.6) ($32.6) $852 -326%
2 20$         $909.0 $42.61 ($22.6) ($56.8) $852 -113%
3 30$         $924.4 $42.61 ($12.6) ($72.3) $852 -42%
4 40$         $930.7 $42.61 ($2.6) ($78.5) $852 -7%
5 80$         $897.2 $42.61 $37.4 ($45.0) $852 47%
6 120$       $822.1 $42.61 $77.4 $30.1 $852 64%
7 140$       $723.2 $42.61 $97.4 $129.0 $852 70%
8 140$       $619.3 $42.61 $97.4 $232.8 $852 70%
9 120$       $530.3 $42.61 $77.4 $321.9 $852 64%
10 90$         $466.8 $42.61 $47.4 $385.3 $852 53%
11 80$         $410.1 $42.61 $37.4 $442.0 $852 47%
12 70$         $360.6 $42.61 $27.4 $491.5 $852 39%
13 65$         $313.7 $42.61 $22.4 $538.5 $852 34%
14 60$         $269.4 $42.61 $17.4 $582.8 $852 29%
15 55$         $227.8 $42.61 $12.4 $624.3 $852 23%
16 50$         $189.2 $42.61 $7.4 $662.9 $852 15%
17 45$         $153.7 $42.61 $2.4 $698.5 $852 5%
18 40$         $121.4 $42.61 ($2.6) $730.8 $852 -7%
19 35$         $92.4 $42.61 ($7.6) $759.7 $852 -22%
20 30$         $67.1 $42.61 ($12.6) $785.1 $852 -42%
21 25$         $45.4 $42.61 ($17.6) $806.7 $852 -70%
22 20$         $27.7 $42.61 ($22.6) $824.5 $852 -113%
23 15$         $14.1 $42.61 ($27.6) $838.1 $852 -184%
24 10$         $4.8 $42.61 ($32.6) $847.4 $852 -326%
25 5$           $0.0 $42.61 ($37.6) $852.1 $852 -752%
26 -$       $0.0 $42.61 ($42.6) $852.1 $852 #DIV/0!
Sum $1,395 $852.1 $852.1  
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Permanent Income / Sustained Yield wt Infrastructure
Yr Revenue
NPV 
Physical 
Asset
Annual 
Draw
Saved 
Revenue 
(A-C)
Financial 
Fund 
Balance
Sum of 
Assets 
(B+E+H)
Saving 
Ratio 
(D/A) Asset Benefit
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I)
0 $852.1 $852.1
1 10$         $884.8 $42.61 ($32.6) ($32.6) $852 -326%
2 20$         $909.0 $42.61 ($22.6) ($156.8) $852 -113% $100.0
3 30$         $924.4 $37.61 ($12.6) ($172.3) $852 -42% $100 $5
4 40$         $930.7 $37.61 ($2.6) ($178.5) $852 -7% $100 $5
5 80$         $897.2 $37.61 $37.4 ($145.0) $852 47% $100 $5
6 120$       $822.1 $37.61 $77.4 ($69.9) $852 64% $100 $5
7 140$       $723.2 $37.61 $97.4 $29.0 $852 70% $100 $5
8 140$       $619.3 $37.61 $97.4 $132.8 $852 70% $100 $5
9 120$       $530.3 $37.61 $77.4 $221.9 $852 64% $100 $5
10 90$         $466.8 $37.61 $47.4 $285.3 $852 53% $100 $5
11 80$         $410.1 $37.61 $37.4 $342.0 $852 47% $100 $5
12 70$         $360.6 $37.61 $27.4 $391.5 $852 39% $100 $5
13 65$         $313.7 $37.61 $22.4 $438.5 $852 34% $100 $5
14 60$         $269.4 $37.61 $17.4 $482.8 $852 29% $100 $5
15 55$         $227.8 $37.61 $12.4 $524.3 $852 23% $100 $5
16 50$         $189.2 $37.61 $7.4 $562.9 $852 15% $100 $5
17 45$         $153.7 $37.61 $2.4 $598.5 $852 5% $100 $5
18 40$         $121.4 $37.61 ($2.6) $630.8 $852 -7% $100 $5
19 35$         $92.4 $37.61 ($7.6) $659.7 $852 -22% $100 $5
20 30$         $67.1 $37.61 ($12.6) $685.1 $852 -42% $100 $5
21 25$         $45.4 $37.61 ($17.6) $706.7 $852 -70% $100 $5
22 20$         $27.7 $37.61 ($22.6) $724.5 $852 -113% $100 $5
23 15$         $14.1 $37.61 ($27.6) $738.1 $852 -184% $100 $5
24 10$         $4.8 $37.61 ($32.6) $747.4 $852 -326% $100 $5
25 5$           $0.0 $37.61 ($37.6) $752.1 $852 -752% $100 $5
26 -$       $0.0 $37.61 ($42.6) $752.1 $852 #DIV/0! $100 $5
Sum $1,395 $852.1 $852.1
Infrastructure
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case 3 Permanent Income / Sustained Yield wt Wages
Yr Revenue
NPV 
Physical 
Asset
Annual 
Draw
Saved 
Revenue 
(A-C)
Financial 
Fund 
Balance
Sum of 
Assets 
(B+E)
Saving 
Ratio 
(D/A)
Value 
Added 
from Labor
NPV 
Wages
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
0 $852.1 $54.08 $852.1 $229.4
1 10$         $884.8 $44.08 ($34.1) ($34.1) $851 -341% 10 $230.9
2 20$         $909.0 $24.08 ($4.1) ($39.9) $869 -20% 30 $212.5
3 30$         $924.4 $14.08 $15.9 ($25.9) $899 53% 40 $183.1
4 40$         $930.7 $14.08 $25.9 ($1.3) $929 65% 40 $152.2
5 80$         $897.2 $19.08 $60.9 $59.5 $957 76% 35 $124.9
6 120$       $822.1 $34.08 $85.9 $148.4 $970 72% 20 $111.1
7 140$       $723.2 $36.08 $103.9 $259.8 $983 74% 18 $98.7
8 140$       $619.3 $37.88 $102.1 $374.9 $994 73% 16.2 $87.4
9 120$       $530.3 $39.50 $80.5 $474.1 $1,004 67% 14.6 $77.2
10 90$         $466.8 $40.96 $49.0 $546.9 $1,014 54% 13.1 $67.9
11 80$         $410.1 $42.27 $37.7 $612.0 $1,022 47% 11.8 $59.5
12 70$         $360.6 $43.45 $26.5 $669.1 $1,030 38% 10.6 $51.8
13 65$         $313.7 $44.51 $20.5 $723.0 $1,037 32% 9.6 $44.9
14 60$         $269.4 $45.47 $14.5 $773.7 $1,043 24% 8.6 $38.5
15 55$         $227.8 $46.33 $8.7 $821.1 $1,049 16% 7.7 $32.7
16 50$         $189.2 $47.11 $2.9 $865.0 $1,054 6% 7.0 $27.3
17 45$         $153.7 $47.80 ($2.8) $905.5 $1,059 -6% 6.3 $22.4
18 40$         $121.4 $48.43 ($8.4) $942.3 $1,064 -21% 5.6 $17.9
19 35$         $92.4 $49.00 ($14.0) $975.4 $1,068 -40% 5.1 $13.7
20 30$         $67.1 $49.50 ($19.5) $1,004.7 $1,072 -65% 4.6 $9.8
21 25$         $45.4 $49.96 ($25.0) $1,030.0 $1,075 -100% 4.1 $6.2
22 20$         $27.7 $50.37 ($30.4) $1,051.1 $1,079 -152% 3.7 $2.8
23 15$         $14.1 $52.08 ($37.1) $1,066.6 $1,081 -247% 2.0 $1.0
24 10$         $4.8 $53.08 ($43.1) $1,076.8 $1,082 -431% 1.0 $0.0
25 5$           $0.0 $54.08 ($49.1) $1,081.6 $1,082 -982% 0.0 $0.0
26 -$       $0.0 $54.08 ($54.1) $1,081.6 $1,082 #DIV/0! 0.0 $0.0
Sum $1,395 $852.1 $852.1 $229.4  
 
The typical sovereign island economy is small and remote.  For example the 
remote island nations of Nauru, Niue, and Saint Helena have populations in the range of 
10 thousand each.  Of course not all island nations are small or remote and neither are 
small or remote economies necessarily islands.  However it is useful to think about the 
economies of small and remote islands because they can help us to understand the 
economic structure and prospects of larger and less remote places. 
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Island economies generally lack a comparative advantage in the production of 
goods or services for export to the rest of the world.  This is due to distance from 
markets and suppliers as well as an absence of economies of scale and specialization, 
both of which drive up the cost of exporting goods and services.  And although the 
economic theory of comparative advantage tells us that trade among countries can 
occur even if one has an advantage in the production of all goods and services, that 
theory can break down if costs in the small and remote economy are too high. 
The mechanism by which the island economy gains access to export markets in 
the presence of high costs is through downward adjustment in the wage.  But in some 
cases the wage would need to become negative to overcome the cost disadvantages 
created by distance and size.  In such a case the island would have a subsistence 
economy with neither exports to the rest of the world or imports.  The most important 
private economic activities one observes in these economies are agriculture and fishing. 
Occasionally an island economy will be able to take advantage of a market niche 
to generate exports.  Tourism is the most common, and mining has provided an export 
base in some other places.  However these market activities will not necessarily be 
large enough to employ a large share of the population.  Furthermore dependence on a 
single activity leaves these economies vulnerable or “precarious”. 
As a consequence many of these economies are dependent on foreign aid and 
remittances from emigrants.  These funds allow these economies to purchase a basic 
level of imports that would not otherwise be possible. 
 
Based on this description one could almost think of Alaska as an island 
economy, as it is often presented on maps of the United States. 
 
Figure 1 the Island Alaska 
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Alaska is certainly remote.  The main population center, Anchorage, is a 3 hour 
plane ride (2,314 kilometers), a 4 day drive, or a week long barge ride from Seattle, the 
nearest US city of comparable size. 
Although it is physically large, the entire population of the state is 710 thousand.  
Only North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming have fewer people. 
These characteristics combine to drive up the cost of trade with the rest of the 
US and world and limit the traditional private sector economic base to a niche market 
consisting primarily of tourism, fishing, and mining. 
In the 50 years that Alaska has been a state those three activities have 
dominated the private economic base.  Figure 2 shows the employment growth 
associated with these sectors.  Tourism has experienced the most growth.  Fishing is 
constrained by the sustainable harvest of the resource.  Mining has provided only a 
small share of jobs.  Air cargo is an activity that takes advantage of the location of 
Anchorage close to the great circle route between the far east and the US west coast.  
Timber has been in decline. 
 
Figure 2 Employment in Alaska Traditional Private Basic Sectors (000) 
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Notably most of the jobs and job growth have been in the two most seasonal 
industries which employ several times as many workers in the summer as in the winter.  
This seasonality makes it difficult for a support economy to take root in areas where 
these sectors dominate. 
The state has struggled to develop a more diversified private sector economic 
base beyond the export of fish and minerals and the provision of services to tourists.  
Most have concentrated on processing or adding value to the natural resources 
extracted and exported.  High production costs and distance from markets have 
prevented development of processing except in the seafood industry.  Federal policies 
that restrict access to natural resources are also often suggested as the main 
impediment to development. 
Like many small and remote islands, the import of public funds has been an 
important source of economic activity in Alaska.  Figure 3 show that federal 
employment, both civilian and military, has historically been higher than employment in 
the traditional private basic sectors, and today remains on par with them.  This figure 
underestimates the importance of federal dollars as it excludes any measure of the 
federal grants that flow into the state each year. 
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Figure 3 Employment in Federal Government in Alaska (000) 
 
 
But there is one way in which Alaska is unlike virtually every small and remote 
island economy.  Shortly after Alaska became a state the largest oil field in North 
America was discovered on the North Slope.  Oil production began at Prudhoe Bay in 
1977 and through 2010 about 17 billion barrels of oil have been produced from that field 
and others on the North Slope and Cook Inlet (discoveries and production began in 
Cook Inlet in the 1960s)  
 
Figure 4 Alaska Oil Production (Million Barrels per Day) 
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The value of oil production has swamped that of all other natural resources 
combined. 
 
Figure 5 Alaska Gross Value of Resource Production (Million 2010 $) 
 
 
The state has been able to capture a large share of the value added from 
production in two ways that have accounted for two thirds of the growth since Alaska 
became a state and have transformed the economy. 
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First, work in the oil patch has been a source of both payroll for Alaskan workers, 
and sales for Alaskan businesses providing services for exploration, development, and 
production activities. 
 
Figure 6 Alaska Natural Resource Wages and Salaries (Million 2010 $) 
 
 
Second, Alaska has cumulatively collected $157 billion (2010 $) in oil revenues 
over the last 50 years.  Oil has been the source of about 90 percent of state general 
fund revenues. 
 
Figure 7 Alaska Oil Revenues and Their Share of State General Fund 
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Oil has accounted for virtually all state resource revenues. 
 
Figure 8 Oil Share of State Natural Resource Revenues 
 
 
Together spending on activity in the oil patch and the expenditure of state oil 
revenues today account for one third of all the jobs in the economy.  But a number of 
spinoffs from oil activity have also contributed to expansion of the economy.  
Consequently today employment and personal income in Alaska are twice the size they 
would have been if the state economic base had only been its other natural resources 
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and federal government spending.  The most important of these spinoffs are stability 
and wealth. 
The jobs generated by activity in the oil patch and the jobs paid for with state oil 
revenues are year round, unlike those associated with either tourism or fishing.  This 
creates an environment within which support businesses can grow and prosper.  As a 
result the “economic multiplier” is larger than it otherwise would have been. 
The oil revenues have reduced the tax burden on businesses and households 
and at the same time allowed state government to spend on public services at a level 
nearly twice the US average, measured by per capita spending.  The lower tax burden 
on businesses has provided an environment for them to prosper and the public services 
have made also more attractive both for businesses and households.  The rapid growth 
in the retiree population in the state is one consequence of that. 
This oil driven rapid economic growth raises the question of whether the state 
has been stricken by the “resource curse”.  Although the oil wealth has led to some 
corruption and rent seeking behavior, it seems that the state has escaped one of the 
important symptoms which is a weakening of the rest of the export base.  This would 
result from the bidding up of the price of labor as a result of the boom in the oil patch 
which would make the rest of the export base less competitive.  However in an 
economy where migration of workers can equilibrate labor markets across regions, this 
is less likely to happen.  Consequently the public expenditure benefits for the rest of the 
export base have probably more than offset any labor market related costs. 
 
Has oil provided a way for Alaska to escape the island economy syndrome?  
That might be the case if oil production and revenues were sustainable looking forward.  
Unfortunately that is not the case.  As Figure 4 shows, annual production peaked more 
than 20 years ago and is today only at one third of that level.  Although the state 
forecasts a slowing of the decline rate for the next 10 years (Figure 9), if one pushes the 
projection out another decade, the decline accelerates significantly (Figure 10).   
Figure 9 Alaska Department of Revenue Oil Production Forecast (Thousand 
Barrels per Day) 
ISER / Managing Extractive Resource Wealth 38 June 2011 
 
 
Figure 10 Oil Production Forecast: ADOR Extended (Thousand Barrels per Day) 
 
 
In has taken the state a long time to become concerned about the oil production 
decline for two reasons.  First, during the last two decades total employment has 
continued to grow as production has fallen.  This suggested that perhaps the economy 
was not as dependent on oil as some thought.  Second, the high oil prices in the last 
decade have driven up oil revenues to unprecedented levels, and this has damped 
concerns about the need to think about the dependence of state government spending 
on the rate of oil production. 
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Now more attention is being directed at the question of what the prospects for the 
economy are because commercialization of North Slope natural gas looks less likely.  
Revenues from gas production could partially substitute for oil.  And as North Slope 
production declines, the continued viability of the pipeline carrying that oil to market 
comes into question.  A lower throughput means that oil moving through the pipeline is 
slower and colder.  Both of those characteristics cause problems for operation of the 
pipeline so there is now more attention being given to the question of how to keep the 
flow rate through the pipeline as high as possible. 
 
Future oil revenues depend on production and price, and again the outlook for 
the next 10 years appears to be good based on the Alaska Department of Revenue 
forecast, but beyond that the projected decline in production drives down revenues. 
 
Figure 11 Projected Oil Revenues (Million 2010 $); Alaska Department of 
Revenue to 2020 and then Extended by the Author 
 
 
If the industry that accounts for one in three jobs in the economy and has 
accounted for two thirds of the growth in the last 50 years is going into decline, what 
does the future hold for Alaska.  Will the economy contract in a pattern that is the 
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reverse of the growth the state has enjoyed?  Will that contraction lead to an 
outmigration population? 
It is not inconceivable that the decline in petroleum could usher in a long term 
period of economic stagnation and population decline.  Looking a decadal population 
change by state in the US since 1910, there have been several instances where 
population has not increased for a 20 year period.  Many of these have been associated 
with migration out of the south and the great plains.  However there have been at least 
three instances of more prolonged decline.  The North Dakota population peaked at 681 
thousand in 1930, fell to 620 in 1950 and had only increased to 673 by 2010.  Arkansas 
was 1.949 million in 1940 and only 1.923 million thirty years later in 1970.  West Virginia 
was 2.006 million in 1950 and only 1.853 million sixty years later in 2010. 
 
 
Many people with limited understanding of the structure of the Alaska economy 
believe the economy can continue to grow independent of petroleum, but the economic 
history of the state suggests that the other export base sectors are too small to take up 
the slack that a declining petroleum industry would create.  Others think that state 
government efforts to diversify the economy could work, even though there is no 
evidence of success after more than 50 years worth of efforts. 
 
In 1978 Alaska created the Permanent Fund as a vehicle to both save a share of 
oil wealth in recognition that oil production was not sustainable, and to dampen the 
economic boom associated with the immediate expenditure of oil revenues when 
collected.  More recently Alaska established the Constitutional Budget Reserve as a 
vehicle to save a portion of current petroleum revenues for use in times when revenues 
were low.  Through a combination of good planning and good fortune the state has set 
aside $37 billion (2010 $) in these and other smaller financial savings accounts—24% of 
the $157 billion collected through 2010.  With accumulated earnings the currently value 
in these accounts is about $45 billion.  The savings in these accounts provides a vehicle 
for the state to offset the anticipated decline in production and revenues. 
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This oil wealth that has been converted into financial assets represents only a 
portion of the total oil wealth the state will receive from production of the resource.  The 
state will also collect revenues from future production.  The amount is impossible to 
know, but it makes sense to try to estimate this wealth still in the ground.  Table 1 
provides such an estimate of $81 billion based on what little information is available 
about the amount of oil (and gas) still in the ground, and the fiscal terms that will govern 
the state share of the total proceeds from the sale of production.  This is the estimated 
net present value of future state petroleum revenues, discounted at a 5% real rate. 
 
Table 1 Value for State Petroleum Wealth in the Ground in 2010 (Billion $ 
Total $81  
Oil $74  
State Land—North Slope 2011-
2020 
$45 Alaska Department of 
Revenue 
State Land—North Slope 2021+ $27 Author estimate 
State Land—Other Locations -  
State Land—Heavy Oil $1 Author estimate 
Federal NPRA - Included in ADOR forecast 
Federal OCS $1 Author estimate 
Federal ANWR - Author estimate 
Gas $7 TransCanada AGIA 
Application adjusted by 
author 
 
In order to minimize the disruption due to the anticipated decline in economic 
activity associated with declining oil production and revenues, the state could convert its 
oil wealth—the financial assets and the oil in the ground which together sum to $126 
billion—into an annuity.  If it spent only the earnings thrown off by that annuity each 
year, it would last forever, and the amount spent would be constant so that it would 
have a stabilizing influence on the economy. 
For example, if we believed that the oil wealth could earn a 5% rate of return, we 
could spend 5% of the value of oil wealth each year and still maintain its value.  This 
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would be $6.3 billion, or $8,900 per person.  If we believed the population of the state 
would grow at 1% annually, then we could only draw 4% each year--$5 billion, or $7,100 
per person.  Then the oil wealth would increase in value 1% each year to match the 
growth in population.tal NPV. 
The amount we can spend does not depend upon how our oil wealth is held, that 
is how much is in the bank and how much is in the ground.  Over time, as oil production 
continues, there will be a gradual transition from oil in the ground to financial assets, as 
shown in Figure 12.  Here we see the value of the state oil wealth before production 
began was slightly less than $100 billion (2010), all in the form of oil in the ground.  As 
the oil has been produced, a share of the revenues have been converted into financial 
assets, and each year the combined value of oil in the ground and financial assets has 
increased by 1% to account for population growth.  Eventually, all the oil will have been 
produced and at that time the state will hold its oil wealth entirely as financial assets. 
Each year the draw from assets would be $7,100 (2010) for each resident. There 
would be no restrictions on how that money was spent.  It could be used to support 
public programs or distributed to individuals for private consumption. 
 
Figure 12 Conversion of Oil Wealth from Oil in the Ground to Financial Assets 
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This strategy stabilizes the fluctuations from the spending of public revenues and 
distributes oil wealth equitably across current and future generations of Alaska 
residents.  This is a reasonable policy if we care as much about future generations as 
we do about the present, and we expect future generations to be no richer or poorer 
than we are today.  Although we might have some ideas about how rich the next 
generation will be, and recent evidence suggests they may be less well off than we are, 
economists cannot tell us how much we should care about the well being of future 
generations of Alaskans.  If we care less about them, obviously we can spend more 
today, but of course they are not here today to make their case. 
An oil wealth annuity might seem like a good idea in the abstract, but there are a 
number of practical challenges to implementation.  First, the accumulation of so much 
money in a financial account might be politically difficult if not impossible to maintain.  
The temptation to spend would be intense and the discipline to hold the draw through 
good times and bad would be hard to maintain.  Of course the state does have the 
Alaska Permanent Fund, which has a balance of $35 billion, so there is a precedent for 
such an account.  Many argue that the Permanent Fund has been successfully 
maintained only because of the annual dividend check distributed to all Alaskans from 
the fund earnings. 
Two popular arguments against holding a saving account aside from the 
philosophical one that the public should not hold wealth (Of course the public sector 
holds many types of assets.).  One is that money in the bank does not generate any 
benefits. 
The more relevant one is that the wealth should go into physical investments in 
infrastructure—transportation and energy are the ones most often suggested—to help 
to overcome ”remoteness”.  These have two kinds of benefit--the short term benefit from 
the construction of these projects, and the longer term benefit from the services that 
they deliver for the economy. 
If the annual flow from an oil wealth annuity would otherwise be stable, then 
putting more into construction spending would create a non sustainable boom.  The 
value of the longer term services would be the wealth those services generated.  Ideally 
a new road or dam would result in an increase in the export base or a reduction in the 
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cost of goods and services for residents.  The value of these would be the increase in 
wealth generated for residents.  If the increase in wealth from that spending exceeds 
the growth if the money were alternatively reinvested, then those infrastructure projects 
should be undertaken. 
 Current state spending from oil wealth is roughly $5 billion.  Based on our 
analysis the state could continue to spend from oil wealth at that rate for the foreseeable 
future.  This spend rate would maintain the oil wealth of the state and forestall any 
economic decline associated with the need to cut back state spending as petroleum 
revenues declined in future years. 
 
Although somewhat more than half the economic expansion from oil production 
has been the result of the spending of public revenues, we cannot ignore the boom 
associated with activity in the oil patch.  If activity in the oil patch falls as production 
declines, the economy will contract in spite of a well designed oil wealth annuity as we 
have described it. 
In Figure 13 we illustrate the challenge.  Initially the economy is supported by oil 
patch spending that generates income of $9.  Over time as oil production falls, oil patch 
spending also falls so the economic contribution of that activity declines until by year 15 
it is only $2.  An oil wealth annuity that pumps $3 into the economy each year (not 
growing with population) would smooth spending from petroleum revenues but not from 
oil patch spending.  In order to smooth spending over time and eliminate the decline 
from the drop in oil patch employment, the spend from the oil wealth annuity would have 
grow as income from oil patch activity fell as reflected in the area labeled as “Infill 
spend”. 
 
Figure 13 Maintaining Economic Stability with Decline in the Oil Patch 
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The math now gets a lot more complicated because the draw from oil wealth is no 
longer a fixed percentage.  In addition, there are two important questions—what will the 
“infill spending” be spent on as a replacement for oil patch spending, and how can the 
discipline necessary to expand the size of the oil wealth account in the short run be 
maintained.  Figure 14 shows the time path for the size of the fund consistent with the 
maintenance spending in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 14 Oil Wealth Growth to Provide Offset for Oil Patch Decline 
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As it turns out, activity in the oil patch as measured by employment, has not declined 
over time with production as Figure 15 demonstrates.  In spite of dramatic technological 
advances in the last 20 years, two factors seem to account for this pattern.  First there is 
a large fixed cost component associated with production.  And second as fields age 
they require increasing levels of maintenance and repair. Figure 16 shows this more 
dramatically as the decline over time in daily barrels of oil produced per employee. 
 
Figure 15 Historical Comparison of Oil Production and Oil Patch Employment 
 
 
 
Figure 16 Barrels per Day per Employee 
ISER / Managing Extractive Resource Wealth 47 June 2011 
 
 
Looking forward, the prospects for stability in oil patch employment are good and the 
the possibility for expansion depends on possible developments in areas beyond those 
currently under production.—on federal lands onshore and offshore, and on the 
commercialization of gas, and technological advances that will make production of 
heavy oil or oil from shale attractive.  For example one recent projection of employment 
in currently producing areas shows only a modest decline in employment over the next 
two decades.  
 
Figure 17 Projection of Oil Patch Employment excluding Federal Lands 
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The Figure 18 Map shows the petroleum provinces on the North Slope.  Most 
production to date has been on state lands onshore in the central North Slope.  
Bordering this province are the federal provinces—ANWR to the east and NPRA to the 
west.  Two provinces of the outer continental shelf in federal waters are the Chukchi 
and the Beaufort Seas.  The combined oil resources in these provinces is currently 
estimated to be about 70 billion barrels (Table 2),  but this is only a guess and does not 
factor in how much might be technically or economically recoverable.  (By comparison 
about 17 billion barrels have been produced from Alaska in the last 50 years.)  
Nonetheless the extraction of only a small part of this resource would generate a large 
number of jobs in the future, although only modest revenues for the state.  Table 3 
shows in detail how state revenues fall as production moves to federal land or federal 
offshore provinces. 
 
Figure 18 Oil and Gas Provinces on North Slope of Alaska 
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Table 2 Estimated Remaining North Slope Oil Resources 
Location Billion Barrels of Oil 
TOTAL  
State  
     Producing Fields 5 
     Yet to be Discovered 2 
     Heavy Oil 30 
Federal Onshore  
     NPRA 1 
     ANWR 10 
Federal Offshore OCS  
     Beaufort Sea  
     Chukchi Sea  
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Table 3 State Fiscal Terms for Oil Production on Lands under Different Ownership 
 ONSHORE TO 3 MILES OFFSHORE12 OFFSHORE 
 STATE FEDERAL13 PRIVATE FEDERAL 
 North Slope Cook Inlet      
 
Lease 
<1980 
Lease 
>1980 
Lease 
<1980 
Lease 
>1980 
NPRA ANWR  3-6 Miles 
More 
Than 6 
Miles14 
ACES 
Production 
Tax 
Yes Yes ELF15 ELF Yes Yes Yes No No 
Corporate 
Income 
Tax 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ?16 ? 
Property 
Tax17, 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No18 No 
State 
Royalty19, 
Typically 
12.5% of 
value 
Typically 
12.5% of 
value 
Typically 
12.5% of 
value 
Typically 
12.5% of 
value 
- - -- - - 
Federal 
Royalty 
- - - - 
Typically 
12.5% of 
value 
Typically 
12.5% of 
value 
- 
Typically 
12.5% of 
value 
Typically 
12.5% of 
value 
State Share 
of Federal 
Royalty20,21 
    22 50%  27% 0% 
          
Royalty—
PF Share23 
25% 50% 25% 50% 25% 25% - 25% - 
Royalty—
GF Share 
75% 50% 75% 50% 75% 75% - 75% - 
 
                                                 
12
 The state owns the continental shelf up to 3 miles offshore. 
13
 Both  NPRA and ANWR have private (Native) in holdings. 
14
 Although Alaska shares no federal royalties beyond 6 miles under current law, the Gulf states receive 37.5 % 
of federal royalties until 2017.  After that they share royalties only on properties leased after 2006. 
15
 Cook Inlet production can still pay taxes at the rate under the old production tax based on the economic limit 
factor (ELF). 
16
 Aggregate state corporate income tax revenues would change from production in the OCS since the formula 
for producers to allocate worldwide income includes property, sales, and production.  OCS reduces the state 
allocation but increases total worldwide income.  In some circumstances the total liability of a producer would 
increase while in other it would decrease. 
17
 The state property tax is shared with local government jurisdictions within which the petroleum property is 
located.  
18
 It is likely that some OCS related infrastructure would be on shore and thus taxable by the state. 
19
 A royalty is a contract negotiated between the owner and developer of the petroleum.  Although 12.5 % of 
wellhead value is typical, many fields have different rates or methods for determining the payment, like net profit 
sharing. 
20
 The statehood act specified 90 percent state sharing of federal royalties, but this has been modified by law for 
NPRA and ANWR. 
21
 Federal bonuses are shared with the state based on the same formula as royalties. 
22
 Based on federal law, the state must share NPRA royalties with locally impacted communities, and in the past 
has retained no revenues.  The vehicle for sharing is the NPRA Special Revenue Fund. 
23
 The Permanent Fund contribution from shared federal royalties is governed by a different statute than state 
royalties 
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Dependence on non renewable resource extraction 
 
 How can the regional economy benefit from this temporary activity 
 
 Look at a simple model  
 
The time pattern of extraction looks like this 
 
 
